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Through the course of this essay, we will provide a clear view on the 
implementation of the MAR in the Greek legal system and on what one might expect 
concerning the imposition of sanctions by the Greek legal order, along with the 
analysis of their legal basis. The final aim is to answer on whether – in the author’s 
opinion – the newly established legal system and legislative process have been 
effective in regards to achieving their goals, which are the strengthening of supervision 
and suppression of instances of market abuse in the financial sector.  
The course of the analysis will be as follows. First, there will be a small 
introduction on the aims of the Market Abuse Regulation, and how they are expected 
to be achieved, through proper supervision and the enforcement of multileveled 
sanctions on violators, in order to justify why their imposition is important in 
supporting the new legislative process, towards the achievement of those aims. 
Afterwards, a more detailed analysis will follow on liability issues, arising under the 
provisions of the Regulation, in conjunction with the sanctions that may be imposed 
from the infringement of those liabilities. In particular, we will deal with the 
obligations and liabilities arising under the principle of market integrity, as regulated 
under Chapter 2, and specifically Article 8 on Inside Dealing, Article 10 on Unlawful 
Disclosure of Information and Article 12 on Market Manipulation, in combination with 
Chapter 3 on Disclosure Requirements. Following the analysis of liabilities and 
sanctions arising from the provisions of the MAR, we will proceed with the exposition 
of some data, extracted by the Greek National Competent Authority for the 
supervision of the financial sector, which is the Hellenic Capital Markets Commission 
and a few interesting decisions, in order to build a concrete point of view on practical 
implementation. Finally, an assessment will be made on whether the sanctioning 
system, as it is formed up to this day, in Greece follows the commands of the European 
spirit for the protection of the capital markets and the importance of the combination 
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of different kinds of sanctions as a means of effectiveness towards the achievement of 
the MAR objectives.  
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The initial creation and institutionalization of the European Community was 
based on the notion of a single and uniform “internal market”, which would lay the 
foundations for a free commercial transactions area, governed by the same rules and 
conditions for all European member–states with the final aim to promote common 
economic growth. The financial services sector constitutes a great part of this 
commercial area. However, equity and capital movement was not specifically 
regulated in the Rome Treaty1.  
Over a period of fifty years and the creation of three different groups of 
experts, Europe managed to develop a legislative process, aiming to maximum 
legislative harmonization and market integrity, two notions that incorporate the 
means to achieve its goal of maximum economic growth on the financial services 
sector. These three reports played a significant role in the European legislation of 
capital markets, as they shed light and set new rules on defective topics, such as the 
problematic and limited liquidity of European markets (Segré Report2), the lack of 
institutionalized and organized regulatory process (Lamfalussy Report3) and the 
deficient supervisory system (de Larosière Report4). 
Through this long-lasting period, the European Union has achieved the 
formation of -what is today- a concrete regulatory regime and protective environment 
of capital markets, widely known as the market abuse regime. The Market Abuse 
Regulation (MAR) constitutes the core of this regime, supplemented by the Market 
Abuse Directive on Criminal Sanctions (CRIM-MAD) and all their level two 
implementing acts. 
                                               
1 (EEC, 1957) The Treaty of Rome in 1957 was the one establishing the European Economic Community  
2 (Segre, 1966) The development of a European capital market 
3 (Lamfalussy, 2001) Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European 
Securities Market, (Commission, 2007) Review of the Lamfalussy process – Strengthening supervisory 
convergencce: “The Lamfalussy process was launched in 2001 for the purpose of strengthening the 
European regulatory and financial sector supervision framework. It consists of four levels. It starts with 
the adoption of the framework legislation (Level 1) and detailed implementing measures (Level 2). For 
the technical preparation of the implementing measures, the Commission is advised by committees, made 
up of representatives of national supervisory bodies, which exist in three sectors: banking, insurance and 
occupational pensions, and the securities markets. These committees then contribute to the consistent 
implementation of Community directives in the Member States, ensuring effective cooperation between 
the supervisory authorities and convergence of their practices (Level 3). Finally, the Commission 
enforces the timely and correct transposition of EU legislation into national law (Level 4).” 
4 (De Larosiere, 2009) The High-Level Group on Financial Supervison in the EU 
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The newly established legal framework was the outcome of “the need to 
establish a more uniform and stronger framework in order to preserve market integrity, 
to avoid potential regulatory arbitrage, to ensure accountability in the event of 
attempted manipulation, and to provide more legal certainty and less regulatory 
complexity for market participants”5. With the adoption of this statement, the 
European Parliament and Council underlined the aim of the new regime, which is the 
economic growth of the financial market through market integrity6 and transparency7 
combined with proper and effective supervision and sanctioning 8.  
During the economic crisis, the ineffectiveness of supervision and sanctioning 
was revealed. This ineffectiveness was outlined in the de Larosière Report and 
adopted, as abovementioned, by the European Commission9. Consequentially the 
importance of strengthening those two areas of the market abuse regime was 
amplified, as it became evidently clear that they play an indisputable role in the 
prevention of market abusive behaviours. Simultaneously, when it comes to regulating 
sanctions and supervision in the capital markets sector under the market abuse 
regime, national legislation becomes relevant and equally important. That is because it 
covers for those areas of European law governed by European directives and not 
regulations. That being said, in Greece, the MAR is directly implemented in Greek 
legislation, accompanied by Greek Law 4443/2016 Part B’10, on the implementation of 
                                               
5 (European Parliament and Council, 2014) Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions for market abuse (market abuse directive), Recital (4), 
Preamble 
6 Ibid, Recital (2), Preamble “An integrated, efficient and transparent financial market requires market 
integrity. The smooth functioning of securities markets and public confidence in markets are prerequisites 
for economic growth and wealth. Market abuse harms the integrity of financial markets and public 
confidence in securities and derivatives”. 
7 Ibid, Recital (7), Preamble “Market abuse is a concept that encompasses unlawful behaviour in the 
financial markets and, for the purposes of this Regulation, it should be understood to consist of insider 
dealing, unlawful disclosure of inside information and market manipulation. Such behaviour prevents full 
and proper market transparency, which is a prerequisite for trading for all economic actors in integrated 
financial markets”. 
8 Ibid, Recital (70), Preamble “A sound prudential and conduct of business framework for the financial 
sector should rest on strong supervisory, investigation and sanction regimes. To that end, supervisory 
authorities should be equipped with sufficient powers to act and should be able to rely on equal, strong 
and deterrent sanction regimes against all financial misconduct, and sanctions should be enforced 
effectively”. 
9 Ibid, Recital (70), Preamble “the de Larosière Group considered that none of those elements is 
currently in place. A review of existing powers to impose sanctions and their practical application aimed 
at promoting convergence of sanctions across the range of supervisory activities has been carried out in 
the Commission Communication of 8 December 2010 on Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial 
sector”. 
10 (Law 4443/2016 - Official Government Gazette (of the H.R.) 232/A/9-12-2016) Part B’ Articles 25-47 
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the CRIM-MAD 2014/57/EU, thus forming the market abuse regime in Greece. 
Moreover, it is the national legal system and authorities, who enforce the 
aforementioned European and national legislation, through the exercise of supervisory 
powers and the imposition of sanctions by the National Competent Authority (NCA) 
and Greek Courts respectively, according to Chapter 5 of the MAR. 
The importance of a proper and continuous supervision by the authorities is 
crucial. Under the watchful eye of the supervisory authorities, the need for compliance 
with the regulatory provisions of the market abuse regime for legal entities and 
persons dealing in a structured financial market is imminent. At the same time, the 
fear of imposition of heavy sanctions, in the form of administrative fines or even of a 
criminal prosecution, grows for those found in violation. Therefore, persons or entities 
who may have been involved in illegal acts, aiming to disrupt the norms of the financial 
market shall have to face a greater risk, while deciding to implicate themselves in such 
actions. Following this logic, it becomes evident that supervision, even if effective, 
needs and is inseparable to a strict and multidimensional sanctioning system. A 
multidimensional sanctioning system creates, as consequence, an excessive risk, when 
someone participates in illegal actions, with the threat of imposition of multiple types 
of sanctions, rather than just administrative sanctions, in the form of pecuniary fines, 
which are undoubtedly harmful for the violator, but could be diminished compared to 
the profits acquired by the offensive behaviour. This was the rationale followed by the 
European legislator while explicitly establishing the structure and framework of the 
supervisory authorities and their ability to impose administrative sanctions and 
simultaneously providing the legal grounds for the institutionalization of criminal 
sanctions set in the discretion of each individual member – state. In addition to these 
two forms of sanctions, although not explicitly addressed in the Regulation, a violator 
always bares the risk of further implications, in the form of compensation for damages 
under his civil liability. Civil liability and the obligation of the violator to compensate a 
third party, for the damages caused, due to his fault, is a notion of civil law not 
unknown to the majority of member – states, which precedes the institutionalization 
of the market abuse regime. Thus, although it cannot be considered directly a part of 
the sanctioning system, it is indirectly the third type of the repercussions one might 
face if found in violation of the market abuse regime. In conclusion, the combination of 
[10] 
 
sanctions guarantees the success of an effective supervision in its aim to prevent and 
suppress abusive behaviours in the financial market. 
Through the course of our analysis, we will shed light on how the MAR and 
CRIM-MAD (under Law 4443/2016 Part B’) have been implemented in the Greek 
national legislation and judicial practice, focusing mostly on the use and effectiveness 
of imposition of sanctions. At the same time, we will make specific reference to the 
legal basis on which administrative and criminal sanctions and civil liability are based. 
Our references include data extracted by the Greek supervisory authority, ie the 
Hellenic Capital Markets Commission, and national jurisprudence, in reference to the 
procedure or legal basis of sanctions. 
 
 
2. Liability Issues and Sanctions11 
In this chapter we will analyze liability issues arising from the obligation of market 
integrity and disclosure of information, in conjunction with the sanctions their 
infringement might generate under Greek Law 4443/2016 Part B’ on Criminal and 
Administrative sanctions. The examination and the analysis will be a step by step 
process, based on the provisions and following the methodology of the Regulation., 
which due to its direct effect and application into national legal systems shows no 
differences in its Greek form. The process will encompass the main three prohibitions of 
insider dealings under Chapter 2 and specifically Articles: 8 (Inside Dealing), 10 
(Unlawful Disclosure of Information) and 12 (Market Manipulation) in conjunction with 
Articles 14 and 15, but also the ad hoc disclosure obligation under Chapter 3 Article 17 
(Public disclosure of inside information). 
A. Inside Information12 
 
The term of inside information, being the key element for all three main 
restrictions of insider dealings under the MAR, was firstly adopted on 2003 under the 
Market Abuse Directive, after the Daimler/Geltl case, on which the European Court of 
Justice gave a clear and concrete definition of the term. Thus, today under Article 7 
MAR inside information is determined as “information of a precise nature, which has 
                                               
11 (Rüdiger Veil, 2017) European Capital Markets Law, 2nd Edition 
12 Ibid, Chapter §14 II,III 
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not been made public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers or to one or 
more financial instruments, and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a 
significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or on the price of related 
derivative financial instruments”13. As information of precise nature have been 
characterized: existing circumstances (facts), future circumstances, intermediate steps 
of a continuous process or, even, rumours, though the last are difficult to determine as 
actual and precise information, relating to a financial instrument or the issuer of a 
financial instrument. For this information to be considered as inside information, they 
need to have not been made public, meaning that the average public did not have at 
the time the ability to acquire them. Finally, this information must have price 
relevance, meaning that a reasonable investor could or would have based his 
investment decision on that information, if acquired.  
By interpreting the terminology of inside information, we conclude to the three 
main prohibitions under the MAR, regarding the use of such information. Those 
prohibitions are laid down under Articles 14 and 15 MAR, which call for the prohibition 
of insider dealing and unlawful disclosure of inside information (Art.14) and for the 
prohibition of market manipulation (Art.15). The aftermath of these prohibitions, are 
the issues of liability, in conjunctions with sanctions, that are being raised for the 
issuers and the investors of financial products traded on a regulated and structured 
capital market, their intermediaries and maybe even some other market participants, 
such as members of the administrative board, management or the supervisory board 
of the issued company. 
B. Insider Dealing14 
 
Under Article 14 MAR “A person shall not (a) engage or attempt to engage in 
insider dealing and (b) recommend that another person engage in insider dealing or 
induce another person to engage in insider dealing”15. This provision strictly prohibits 
the use of inside information that a person may possess, by acquiring for itself or a 
                                               
13 (European Parliament, 2014) Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) Article. 7(1)a 
14 (Rüdiger Veil, 2017) Chapter §14 IV 
15 (European Parliament, 2014) Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation), Article 14 (a) & (b) 
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third party, either directly or indirectly, any financial instruments and the reason for 
the acquisition being that specific information. The main feature of use of privileged 
information by the holder, which justifies the imposition of the prohibition, is that he 
draws unjustified benefit from this information to the detriment of third parties, who 
are not aware of this information. Thus, the aim of this prohibition is to make sure that 
all investors will have the same and equal means, while deciding on their investment 
and they will be protected from the misuse of inside information16. Consequently, the 
integrity of the financial markets is protected and the entrustment of investors in the 
markets is reassured17.  
The prohibition described on Article 14 creates a specific kind of liability, 
burdening the persons to which it applies, as prescribed under Article 8 par. 4 MAR, in 
conjunction with Article 28 par. 2 of Greek Law 4443/2016. In particular, under Article 
8, the restriction of use, applies to any person who (a) possesses inside information as 
a result of being a member of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies 
of the issuer or emission allowance market participant, (b) has a holding in the capital 
of the issuer or emission allowance market participant, (c) has access to the 
information through the exercise of his employment, profession or duties, (d) is 
involved in criminal activities18. In addition, Article 28 par. 2 b) also includes any person 
who has obtained privileged information, in circumstances other than those above, 
when he knows that it is privileged information19. It is obvious that the strict liability 
falls over persons considered as "primary holders" of inside information, a term that 
has prevailed in theory and case law20. However, it is accepted that not only primary 
holders, fall under the prohibition of use of acquired inside information. The 
prohibition may also affect a taxi driver or a psychologist, for example, who might 
become holders of privileged information in an indirect way, by merely hearing about 
                                               
16 Ibid, Recital (23) Preamble 
17 (European Parliament, 2003) Recital (11) MAD Preamble, (Ypourgos Oikonomikon and Proïstamenos 
DOY Amfissas v Charilaos Georgakis, 2007) par.42 
18 (European Parliament, 2014) Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation), Article 8 (4) 
19 (Law 4443/2016 - Official Government Gazette (of the H.R.) 232/A/9-12-2016) Article 28 par. 2 b) 
20 (Avgitidis, 2019) Δίκαιο της Κεφαλαιαγοράς (Capital Market Law), 2nd, p.340, (Antonopoulos, 2005) 
Κατάχρηση εμπιστευτικών πληροφοριών στις χρηματιστηριακές συναλλαγές (Abuse of inside information in 
stock exchange transactions) p. 117, (Ypourgos Oikonomikon and Proïstamenos DOY Amfissas v 
Charilaos Georgakis, 2007), (Spector Photo Group NV and Chris Van Raemdonck v. Commissie voor het 
Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA), 2009)  
[13] 
 
it by chance from their client, who happens to be part of board of directors21. The 
difference here stands on, whether their change in position of acquisition or disposal 
of financial instruments may influence or define the price. 
Furthermore, under Article 8 MAR, the act of insider dealing is described as 
follows. “1. …insider dealing arises where a person possesses inside information and 
uses that information by acquiring or disposing of, for its own account or for the 
account of a third party, directly or indirectly, financial instruments to which that 
information relates. The use of inside information by cancelling or amending an order 
concerning a financial instrument to which the information relates where the order was 
placed before the person concerned possessed the inside information, shall also be 
considered to be insider dealing…” and “2. …recommending that another person 
engage in insider dealing, or inducing another person to engage in insider dealing, 
arises where the person possesses inside information and recommends, on the basis of 
that information, that another person (a) acquire or dispose of financial instruments to 
which that information relates, or induces that person to make such an acquisition or 
disposal, or (b) cancel or amend an order concerning a financial instrument to which 
that information relates, or induces that person to make such a cancellation or 
amendment”.  
Under Article 28 par. 1, 3, 4 of Law 4443/2016 the criminal sanctions implied 
under the Greek legal system, on the violators of Article 8 par. 1 MAR are prescribed 
and they provide: 
- 1 to 5 years of imprisonment, if a) the average daily value of the illegal 
transactions exceeds the amount of one hundred thousand (100.000) euros 
or b) for a specific day the amount of one hundred and fifty (150.000) 
euros.22  
- 5 to 10 years of imprisonment a) if the overall value exceeds the amount of 
two million (2.000.000) euros b) if the daily average value exceeds the 
amount of two hundred and fifty thousand (250.000) euros c) the gain or 
loss exceeds the amount of four hundred thousand (400.000) euros d) the 
                                               
21 (SEC v. Switzer, 1984) The case refers to information acquired indirectly while overhearing a random 
phonecall, without the purpose of sharing illegal inside information, but that led to priviledged 
knowledge for the defendants and made the information material. Findings of fact 41-43. 
22 (Law 4443/2016 - Official Government Gazette (of the H.R.) 232/A/9-12-2016) Article 28 par. 1  
[14] 
 
violator acted by custom and by profession and the overall profit or loss 
exceeds the amount of one hundred and fifty thousand (150.000) euros.23  
- 5 to 15 years of imprisonment if the violator of the provisions of par. 3 a, b 
or c acts by custom and by profession.24 
- 10 to 15 years of imprisonment if the violator of the provisions of par. 3 is a 
member and acted for the purpose and profit of a criminal organization.25 
In addition, specific reference shall be made on the provision of the second 
paragraph of Article 8 MAR, as prescribed above, which prohibits recommending or 
inducing to a third party the notion of inside dealing. This is a “catch-all” clause in 
order to prevent instances, where the holder of inside information, uses a third party 
to complete the act of inside dealing on his behalf, attempting this way to avoid or 
circumvent the prohibition.26 For the violators of this provision the Greek legislator 
prescribed for separate criminal sanctions as described below under Article 29 of Law 
4443/2016: 
- 3 months to 5 years of imprisonment for the violators who recommend or 
induce the act of insider dealing.27 
- 1 to 5 years of imprisonment for those who acted upon the 
recommendation or inducement, knowing that it was based on privileged 
information.28  
- 5 days to 2 years of imprisonment if the person that received the 
recommendation or inducement, disclosed to third parties the information 
he received, knowing it was privileged at the time of disclosure.29 
Finally, it is important to point out that, both literature and jurisprudence, 
accept the need of causation between the specific inside information and the 
acquisition or disposal of a financial product. Therefore, the mere strengthening of a 
preexisting decision due to the acquisition of inside information, does not fall under 
                                               
23 Ibid, Article 28 par. 3 
24 Ibid, Artcile 28 par. 4  
25 Ibid, Artcile 28 par. 4 
26 (Rüdiger Veil, 2017) Chapter 14 § IV, 4. Recommending or Inducing 
27 (Law 4443/2016 - Official Government Gazette (of the H.R.) 232/A/9-12-2016) Article 29 par. 1 
28 Ibid, Article 29 par. 2 
29 Ibid, Article 29 par. 3 
[15] 
 
the scope of the prohibition of its use, while, on the other hand, the decision to 
proceed on additional acquisitions or disposals based on the information, does.  
 
The case of legitimate behaviour 
 
Following a significant number of cases, between which was its ruling in 
Spector30, the ECJ had to provide more concrete and clear definitions and guidelines, 
as to what exactly could fall within the scope of use of inside information and most 
importantly the prohibition of such use and the liabilities it entailed. As an outcome, 
the MAR was enriched with a detailed provision on what we call today “legitimate 
behaviour”. Legitimate behaviour is institutionalized under Article 9 MAR, in order to 
specify the frame of the abovementioned causation, between the use of inside 
information and its legality or lack thereof, by taking as a concrete fact that the person 
who possessed the information, has indeed used it. In other words, the provision of 
Article 9 contains detailed rules on the legally allowed and accepted use of inside 
information, which does not immediately fall within the scope of insider dealing. 
Nonetheless, it is up to the holder, and further user of the information, to prove the 
legitimacy of his transactions, which are not directly exempted.  
In this aspect, there is a clear distinction between legal and natural persons. 
Legal persons are to prove an internal structure for the prevention of such use, 
whereas natural persons are to justify the legitimacy of their action. Regarding a legal 
person, legitimacy can by based on the fact it has established, implemented and 
maintained adequate and effective internal arrangements and procedures, that 
effectively ensure that no natural person who might had any influence on that 
decision, was in possession of the inside information and has not encouraged, made a 
recommendation to, induced or otherwise influenced the natural person who, on 
behalf of the legal person, acquired or disposed of financial instruments to which the 
information relates31.On the other hand, if a natural person is a market maker or a 
person authorised to act as a counterparty, or is authorised to execute orders on 
                                               
30 (Spector Photo Group NV and Chris Van Raemdonck v. Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en 
Assurantiewezen (CBFA), 2009) 
31 (European Parliament, 2014)Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) Article 9 (1) 
[16] 
 
behalf of third parties and did so under its expected legal and professional duties, or 
the transaction is carried out in the discharge of an obligation that has become due in 
good faith and either that obligation results from an order placed, or an agreement 
concluded, before the person concerned, possessed inside information, or that 
transaction is carried out to satisfy a legal or regulatory obligation that arose, before 
the person concerned possessed inside information32. Moreover, while acquiring 
inside information during negotiations on a public takeover or merger, the use of such 
information by a natural person is not prohibited if it relates with their procedure, 
provided that at the point of approval of the merger or acceptance of the offer by the 
shareholders of that company, any inside information has been made public or has 
otherwise ceased to constitute inside information33. Finally, the knowledge of one’s 
own personal decision and acting on it, through dealing in financial instruments, does 
not constitute insider dealing34.  
 Although legitimate behaviour, as determined on Article 9 MAR, creates a safe 
harbour for those types of use of inside information, not deemed first-hand as insider 
dealing and thus providing legal certainty, it is not as and concrete as it should be. This 
is due to the last (6th) paragraph of the provision, which commands that an 
infringement of the prohibition of insider dealing set out in Article 14 may still be 
deemed to have occurred, if the competent authority establishes that there was an 
illegitimate reason for the orders to trade, transactions or behaviours concerned35. The 
inclusion of this provision, and consequentially of this probability, creates the 
uncertainty for the user, for the National Competent Authorities, in our case the 
Hellenic Capital Markets Commission, holding an opposite decision, not in favor of the 
trader, after he has already proceeded in the use and, thus having no other means of 
protection. In particular if the NCA decides on the illegitimacy of the transaction made, 
either from the company as a legal person, or one of its employees or administrative 
staff, it will then hold them accountable on behaviours, they thought they were acting 
legally on at the time and were protected from the charge of inside dealings. 
 
                                               
32 Ibid, Article 9 (2) & (3) 
33 Ibid, Article 9 (4) 
34 Ibid, Article 9 (5) 
35 Ibid, Article 9 (6) 
[17] 
 
C. Unlawful Disclosure of information36 
 
 Under the provisions of Article 14 and 10 MAR “A person … (c) shall not 
unlawfully disclose inside information”37 and “…unlawful disclosure of inside 
information arises where a person possesses inside information and discloses that 
information to any other person…”38. The combination of these two provisions 
primarily creates a liability to any legal or natural person (as determined under Article 
8 par. 4 and analysed above), who discloses inside information. In Greece, under 
Article 30 Law 4443/2016 the violators face 5 days to 3 years of imprisonment, unless 
they fall under the exceptions that follow below39.  
Article 10 MAR contains also the determination of an exception, under which 
the disclosure is considered legal and, thus, allowed. As such, the disclosure is 
permitted and justified, when “…the disclosure is made in the normal exercise of an 
employment, a profession or duties”40. The justification demands for a close link 
between the disclosure and the exercise of employment and most importantly, that 
the disclosure was inevitable and utterly necessary for such exercise. The exception 
and its interpretation were the outcome of the ECJ ruling on the Grøngaard/Bang41 
case at an earlier time, under the provisions of Directive 89/592/EEC42 on insider 
dealing. In judging the case, from a reference for preliminary ruling, the Court held 
that the prohibition does not apply per se, on all instances of unlawful disclosure of 
information. In particular, the provisions are not applicable, when the unlawful 
disclosure takes place during the normal exercise of employment, profession or duties. 
 National courts are responsible and have the authority to determine, whether 
the disclosure falls or not under the exception. The determination is not uniform, but 
the Court takes into consideration the specific circumstances of each case, in 
combination with the national laws that apply on labour and company law. These 
areas of law, are the ones that will indicate what is considered as commonly accepted 
                                               
36 (Rüdiger Veil, 2017) Chapter 14 §IV, 3.Unlawful Disclosure of Information 
37 (European Parliament, 2014) Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) Article 14 (c) 
38 Ibid, Article. 10 (1) 
39 (Law 4443/2016 - Official Government Gazette (of the H.R.) 232/A/9-12-2016) Article 30 
40 (European Parliament, 2014) Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) Article. 10 (1) 
41 (Criminal proceedings against Knud Grøngaard and Allan Bang, 2005) 
42 (European Council, 1989) 
[18] 
 
practice on the exercise of employment, profession or duties and accordingly, when 
the act of disclosing inside information has exceeded the legal boundaries. Moreover, 
what national courts need to factor in, is the sensitivity of the disclosed information, 
weighing on whether the acquisition of this specific information, could alter the 
market price and the general condition of marketability of the financial products in 
question. Finally, the Court shall always keep in mind that the exception must always 
be interpreted strictly, in order to avoid the dissemination of information contrary to 
the market abuse regime.  
 
The case of market sounding  
 
Specific reference is made in the Regulation on “market sounding”, which 
constitutes an allowed disclosure of information, considered as accepted common 
practice of exercise of employment. In particular, “a market sounding comprises the 
communication of information, prior to the announcement of a transaction, in order to 
gauge the interest of potential investors in a possible transaction and the conditions 
relating to it such as its potential size or pricing”43. However, the technique of market 
sounding is not without limitations. Specific guidelines and rules are set for the 
legitimate use of the practice, that create further obligations and liabilities, if not 
followed and complied with correctly. These obligations are laid down under Article 11 
paragraphs 3 and 5 MAR, which suggest that a disclosing market participant shall, prior 
to conducting a market sounding, specifically consider if it will involve the disclosure of 
inside information. If it does, he shall make a written record of its conclusion and the 
reasons therefor and provide it to the competent authority upon request. This shall 
happen for every act of disclosure44. Moreover, before making the disclosure, the 
disclosing market participant shall also obtain the consent, of the person receiving the 
market sounding, to receive inside information and inform them that they are 
prohibited from using that information and shall keep it confidential45. For the 
prohibition of use of market soundings, the same conditions apply, as described for the 
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use of inside information under Articles 7 and 8 MAR. In addition, there have been a 
series of more specific terms defined by the Commission Delegated Regulation 
2016/960/EU with regard to regulatory technical standards for the appropriate 
arrangements, systems and procedures for disclosing market participants conducting 
market soundings46 and the ESMA Guidelines for persons receiving market 
soundings47. 
D. Market Manipulation48 
 
 Under the provisions of Article 15 “a person shall not engage in or attempt to 
engage in market manipulation”. Market manipulation is the outcome of the 
manipulator’s intervention on the current market price, and overall marketability, of a 
financial product, by interfering with the free and fair operation of the market and 
creating artificial and misleading price indicators. A typical example of market 
manipulation is the increase of the product price before sales and its decrease before 
acquisition, in order for the price to be favourable for the manipulator. One way or the 
other, manipulative behavior prevents the market from being fully transparent and 
thus, causes the loss of confidence of investors on the market. Ultimately, this will lead 
to their exit from the market due to its lack of integrity and consequentially weaken 
the market. In relevance to the prohibition, Article 12 MAR defines four specific 
activities which, when taking place into a regulated or even an unregulated market, fall 
under the scope of manipulation. Under the new market abuse regime, as such 
activities are characterized not only transactions or trading orders, but also any kind of 
behaviour that might occur even outside of the physical limits of a trading venue49. 
Moreover, the MAR prohibits even an attempt to manipulate and, as a result, such 
attempts are also punished. These activities are prohibited for all market participants 
and the liabilities they create apply accordingly to all of them, without exception.  
                                               
46 (European Commision & European Parliament, 2016) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 
2016/960 of 17 May 2016 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for the appropriate arrangements, systems 
and procedures for disclosing market participants conducting market soundings 
47 (European Securities and Markets Authority, 2016) MAR Guidelines – Persons receiving market 
soundings 
48 (Rüdiger Veil, 2017) Chapter 15 
49 (European Parliament, 2014) Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) Recital (46), Preamble 
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In particular, market manipulation can be either transaction – based, through 
the use of misleading indicators in regard to, or by securing, the supply, demand or 
price of financial instruments50, or information – based, via the dissemination of 
misleading information, or even rumors, through the media, internet or any other 
means of information dispersion51. There is also a combination of transaction – and 
information – based manipulation, which employs a fictitious device or any other form 
of deception or contrivance52. This prohibition constitues the “catch-all” clause of the 
MAR on market manipulation, in order to contain any other forms of manipulation that 
may appear after its entry into force and thus, were not taken into consideration 
during its drafting. The fourth activity concerns benchmark manipulation, a special 
form of information – based manipulation, which takes place when transmitting false, 
or misleading information or inputs in relation to a benchmark, or takes place as any 
other behaviour which manipulates the calculation of a benchmark. In this occasion, 
the person who made the transmission or provided the input needs to know, or ought 
to have known, that it was false or misleading53.  
All four activities are criminally sanctioned under Article 31 of Law 4443/2016 -
primarily- with imprisonment from 1 to 5 years. What differs is the value criteria. 
Regarding transaction – based manipulation and manipulation with the use of a 
fictitious device, the average daily value of the illegal transactions must exceed a) the 
amount of one hundred and fifty thousand (150.000) euros, or for a specific day the 
amount of two hundred and fifty (250.000) euros54 and regarding information – based 
manipulation, the profits acquired must exceed the amount of one hundred thousand 
(100.000) euros. However, the above predicted penalty alters in 5 to 10 years of 
imprisonment if a) the overall value of transactions exceeds the amount of five million 
(5.000.000) euros, b) the daily average value exceeds the amount of five hundred 
thousand (500.000) euros, c) the profit exceeds the amount of five hundred thousand 
(500.000) euros or d) the violator acts by custom or by profession and his profit 
exceeds the amount of two hundred and fifty thousand (250.000) euros55. The 
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predicted penalty also changes in 5 to 15 years in the cases a), b) and c) if the violator 
acted by custom or by profession56 and in 10 to 15 years, if the violator of all cases, is a 
member and acts on behalf and for the profit of a criminal organization57.  
In order to provide a more concrete and clear determination of what falls 
under the scope of transaction – based manipulation and manipulation with the use of 
fictitious devices, the MAR in its Annex I contains a list of non – exhaustive indicators 
which, when taken into consideration, are capable to help us define the existence of a 
manipulative behaviour. A supplement to these indicators is also the Commission 
Delegated Regulation 2016/522/EU with its Annex II Sections 1 and 2.  
However, the mere existence of such indicators, does not lead to a per se 
conclusion of market manipulation. This is because, simultaneously, Article 13 MAR 
provides for legitimate reasons and accepted market practices58 on transaction – 
based manipulation, which justify transactions, orders or behaviours, that might 
otherwise be considered manipulative. The responsibility to define, whether the 
activity is justifiable for legitimate reasons and has complied with the accepted market 
practices, falls once again on the national competent authorities59. Nevertheless, the 
Regulation itself does not contain any clarifications as to what constitutes a legitimate 
reason, neither have ESMA or the Commission released any technical standards or 
delegated acts regarding this matter. As a result, the ones that need to prove that 
acted legitimately are the market participants accused for manipulation. At the other 
side of the spectrum, Article 13 par. 2 contains specific criteria, as to what constitutes 
accepted market practices, which are taken into consideration by the NCAs, while 
deciding on whether to accept and justify an activity. ESMA also published technical 
standards, which were reviewed and codified by the Commission under the Delegated 
Regulation 2016/908/EU in coordination with the provisions of Article 13 paragraphs 
3-7. The criteria for accepted market practices, defined under the second paragraph, 
are not permanent and have to be reviewed by the national competent authorities on 
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Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation), Article 13 (1)-(9) 
59 Ibid, Article 13 (2),(3),(5),(6),(8) 
[22] 
 
a regular basis60, keeping in mind that the transparency and integrity of the market is 
an inviolable term for the preservation of a productive free market. 
On the other hand, the MAR, under the provision of Article 12 (2), provides for 
a list of, also non – exhaustive, instances of market manipulation, which nontheless, if 
existent, do constitute -without exception- a manipulative behaviour over the market. 
These instances include the following. (a) The abuse of a dominant market position, by 
fixing or affecting, directly or indirectly, a purchase or sale price or by creating unfair 
trading conditions of a financial instrument61. (b) The “marking the close” technique, 
through which buying or selling orders are executed at the opening or closing times of 
the market, giving misleading indicators on those prices62. (c) The “layering or stuffing” 
technique, which is executed using algorithmic or high frequency trading, to place 
orders, without a realistic intention to trade, with the aim to disrupt the function of 
the venue, prevent the identification of genuine orders, or create false or misleading 
indicators63. (d) The “scalping” technique, through which the manipulator voices an 
opinion, by taking advantage of his access to traditional or electronic mass media, 
capable of influencing the price of, usually traded in illiquid markets, financial 
instruments such as shares, having previously positioned on those instruments and 
thus profiting by the consequential market influence64. (e) The buying or selling on the 
secondary market of emission allowances or related derivatives prior to the auction 
held pursuant to Regulation 1031/2010/EU with the effect of fixing the auction 
clearing price for the auctioned products at an abnormal or artificial level or misleading 
bidders bidding in the auctions65. 
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 The cases of buy-back programmes and stabilization66  
 
With regard to market abuse and its prohibition, Article 5 MAR, and 
supplementarily the Commission Delegated Regulation 2016/1052/EU67 for the 
specification of their conditions, provide for an exemption on this aspect, for the 
occasions of trading in one’s own shares in buy-back programmes68 and stabilization of 
securities69.  
Apropos of the ability of a company to acquire its own shares, as known as 
“buy-back programme”, companies use it for two reasons. It is a tactic used, either to 
create the confidence to investors that the securities of the company are not 
undervalued and this way help stabilize or increase the share price, or used as a 
currency for acquisitions in order to prevent takeovers or meet obligations on 
employee share options programmes70. The reason behind the creation of this 
exception was the high importance of these techniques, for the issuers of the 
securities, for which it is prescribed. However, one needs to take notice to the fact 
that, at the point that the share price starts deviating from its real value, it is a sign 
that the price is not determined on a free market basis anymore, but by the company 
instead. At this point, the activity falls under the scope of market manipulation.  
For the buy-back to be exempted from the abuse regime, the company needs 
to comply with specific provisions. First, the objective of the programme is legitimate 
only under two conditions, which are the reduction of the issuer’s capital or meeting 
its obligations arising from debt financial instruments that are exchangeable into 
equity instruments, or from share option programmes, or other allocations of shares, 
to employees or to members of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies 
of the issuer or of an associate company71. In addition, disclosure obligations to the 
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competent authority of the trading venue and the public must be fulfilled, before the 
commencement of trading as part of the buy-back programme72. All the information 
demanded is described in Regulation 600/2014/EU73 in combination with the 
Commission Delegated Regulation 2016/1052/EU74, along with the trading conditions 
and restrictions75. Trading restrictions set limits to the price and volume of the 
transactions, so that the acquisition of the shares by the issuer company does not 
result in artificial price increases. Such restrictions are the prohibition to sell its own 
shares during the period of the buy-back programme and to trade altogether during 
the closed periods as prescribed under Article 19 (11) MAR, or where the issuer has 
decided to delay the public disclosure of inside information in accordance with Article 
17(4) or (5) MAR76. Exemptions to these restrictions apply for time-scheduled buy-back 
programmes or programmes that are managed by an investment firm or credit 
institution, which makes its trading decisions concerning the timing of the purchases of 
the issuer's shares independently of the issuer77. 
With regard to the stabilization technique, it is defined as a purchase or offer to 
purchase securities, or a transaction in associated instruments equivalent thereto, 
which is undertaken by a credit institution or an investment firm in the context of a 
significant distribution of such securities exclusively for supporting the market price of 
those securities for a predetermined period of time, due to a selling pressure in such 
securities78. Thus, only credit institutions and investment firms are exempted from 
market abuse under the justification of stabilization activities and in any case, they 
need to be carried out for a limited period. In particular, in the case of an initial public 
offering, the period starts on the date of commencement of trading and ends no later 
than 30 calendar days thereafter. In the case of a secondary offer, starts on the date of 
adequate public disclosure of the final price of the securities and ends no later than 30 
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calendar days after the date of allotment79. In addition, the act of stabilization has to 
conform to the adequate disclosure obligations set under Article 5 (5) MAR and Article 
6 of the Commission Delegated Regulation 2016/1052/EU. In particular, the public 
must be informed, by the issuer, the offeror or the entity, for the fact that stabilization 
might take place, during which period and by which entity and trading venue and after 
its conclusion, the competent authority needs to be informed of, whether stabilization 
actually took place and the transactions it concerns, if it did80. Accordingly, price limits 
and trading conditions apply under Article 5 (6) MAR.  
 
E. Disclosure Requirements81 
 
 The obligation of disclosure of information is the strongest asset, which 
enriches the market abuse regime, and consequentially the MAR. This statement is 
based to the indisputable fact that information is key to an open market. It constitutes 
the main factor on which investors will base their investment decisions and, most 
importantly, the one that has the ability to influence financial products with the 
greatest appeal on their price, demand and overall marketability. It is also proven, 
through the course of experience over financial markets and financial research, that 
publicity over privileged information improves the transparency of the market. The 
reason why, is that it leads to the reduction of incidents of insider dealings and market 
manipulation, because once an information is made public, and thus available to the 
majority of market participants, it loses its power over a trading advantage. The 
reduction of informational asymmetries contributes to a more equal and productive 
capital market, with the participation of as much market participants as possible, 
which is the main goal of the European economic practice.  
 Disclosure of information under the aggregated market abuse regime is 
achieved in two ways. First, there is the obligation to publish a prospectus of 
information, when the financial product is offered to public or admitted for trading on 
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a regulated market for the first time82, which is followed by the obligation of 
consecutive periodic disclosures83 of information by the issuer regarding their 
marketed financial product. These obligations are regulated by separate legislative acts 
and in particular, the Prospectus Regulation 2017/1129/EU and the Transparency 
Directive 2013/50/EU in combination with Directive 2004/109/EC84, which set the 
guiding principles and obligations of this type of information disclosure. Second, there 
are the disclosure requirements set by the MAR under Chapter 3 and in particular 
Article 17. Due to the focus of this analysis specifically on the implementation of the 
MAR, the second way will be the subject of further analysis. However, one must always 
keep in mind that the disclosure of information is only successful, when combining 
both the obligation of periodic disclosure and the obligation of disclosure of inside 
information, in order to continually supply the market with information on the issuer. 
 Under Article 17 (1) MAR “An issuer shall inform the public as soon as possible 
of inside information which directly concerns that issue”. The obligation concerns 
inside information as determined under Article 7 MAR in conjunction with Recital (49) 
MAR85, as described above. The obligation of disclosure concerns mainly the issuer, or 
an emission allowance market participant. Specifically issuers who have requested or 
approved admission of their financial instruments to trading on a regulated market in a 
member - state. Moreover, in the case of instruments only traded on an MTF or on an 
OTF, it concerns issuers who have approved trading of their financial instruments on 
an MTF or an OTF or have requested admission to trading of their financial instruments 
on an MTF in a Member State86. The obligation is extended, in addition, to persons 
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acting on behalf or for the account of the issuer and who disclose any inside 
information to any third party in the normal course of the exercise of their 
employment, profession or duties87. On the other hand, issuers are not allowed to 
offset information, by disclosing and disseminating simultaneously positive and 
negative information, in order to balance the reaction of the market to negative 
information, and they are also not allowed to combine their disclosure of inside 
information with marketing activities in their favor. In practice, two main legal 
problems have arisen. First, it is not clear to which member - state the issuer has to 
fulfil its obligation, when trading in multiple markets. A possible answer is provided by 
Article 21 (1) and (3) of the Transparency Directive88 under which is stated that, the 
obligation is to be fulfilled in the home country, unless the financial products are 
traded to only one member state, which is not the home member state. Second, with 
regard to groups of companies and their subsidiaries, it is not clearly determined when 
and whether parent companies have to disclose information concerning their 
subsidiaries or if companies of corporate groups have to disclose information on other 
companies of the same group.  
 
 The case of delay of disclosure89 
 
 Contrary to the abovementioned obligation of disclosure, the provision of 
Article 17 (4) MAR provides for an exception. A delay in disclosure. This provision is of 
great importance, as is simultaneously a big asset, but creates also a huge liability, on 
the issuer. 
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In specific occasions, an early disclosure of information could turn out to be 
dangerous or catastrophic for the issuer. Therefor a delay on disclosure is considered 
essential for balancing the protection of interests of listed companies and the 
transparency of the market. On this account, issuers are allowed to delay, on their own 
responsibility, the public disclosure of information, if three conditions are met in total. 
First, immediate disclosure is likely to prejudice the legitimate interests of the issuer or 
emission allowance market participant. Second, the delay of disclosure is not likely to 
mislead the public. Third, the issuer or emission allowance market participant, has to 
able to ensure the confidentiality of that information. If the confidentiality is breached, 
even by a rumor that is quite accurate in relation with the information, whose 
disclosure has been delayed, then confidentiality ceases to exist, and the issuer has to 
disclose it to the public90. This also applies in the case of a protracted process that 
occurs in stages and that is intended to bring about, or that results in, a particular 
circumstance or a particular event. If an issuer choses to use this exception, he needs 
to inform the competent authority, that the disclosure of the information was delayed. 
He also has to provide a written explanation of how the conditions set out in this 
paragraph were met, immediately after the information is disclosed to the public. 
Alternatively, Member States may provide that a record of such an explanation is to be 
provided only upon the request of the competent authority specified under paragraph 
391. The delay may be indefinite, as long as the conditions apply to the occasion.  
With regard to the legitimate interest of the issuer, under the first criteria, 
reference is made on the MAR under the provisions of Recital (50)92 and Article 17 (11) 
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MAR. The recital mirrors Article 3(1) of Directive 2003/124/EC and is complemented by 
the ESMA 2016/1130 guidelines on legitimate interest for delay of disclosure93, based 
on the examples provided by CESR in its second set of Guidance (CESR/06-562b). In 
particular, in its final report ESMA states that cases where immediate disclosure of 
inside information is likely to prejudice the issuer’s legitimate interests could include, 
but are not limited to the following circumstances. (a) Negotiations where the 
outcome would likely be jeopardized by immediate public disclosure, such as mergers, 
acquisitions, splits and spin-offs, restructuring and reorganizations. (b) Its viability is in 
grave and immediate danger although not yet insolvent and immediate public 
disclosure would jeopardize negotiations designed to ensure financial recovery. (c) 
Approval of supervisory board required (only applicable for two-tier board and very 
restricted). (d) Immediate disclosure is likely to jeopardize the intellectual property 
rights of a product or invention under development. (e) Immediate disclosure would 
likely jeopardize the implementation of a plan to buy or sell a major holding in another 
entity. (f) A transaction previously announced is subject to a public authority’s 
approval, where disclosure of the conditions will likely affect the ability to meet them 
and so prevent the final success of the deal or transaction94. However, the list is non-
exhaustive and there needs to be an independent and case-by-case analysis. 
Nonetheless, the delay must not be used as the “back door” of avoidance of the 
obligation of disclosure, which constitutes the foremost goal against the protection of 
the issuers’ interests.  
In addition, ESMA has provided in its guidelines, the use of three criteria when 
it comes to determining the ability of information to mislead the public, by creating an 
impression contrary to reality regarding the issuer. This, also non – exhaustive, list 
mentions that the inside information, whose disclosure the issuer intends to delay (a) 
is materially different from the previous public announcement of the issuer on the 
matter to which the inside information refers to (b) regards the fact that the issuer’s 
financial objectives are not likely to be met, where such objectives were previously 
publicly announced or (c) is in contrast with the market’s expectations, where such 
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expectations are based on signals that the issuer has previously sent to the market, 
such as interviews, roadshows or any other type of communication organized by the 
issuer or with its approval95. 
Nonetheless, falling under this exception is not without risks. It is quite difficult 
to pre-determine the length of existence of the three criteria mentioned and most 
importantly, to determine the exact moment in time, when one of them ceases to 
exist. From that moment forward, the issuer holds great liability, because his 
obligation to disclose the information resurfaces and has to comply with it without 
undue delay. Consequentially, from the moment of cease of existence, for even one of 
the criteria, until the moment of disclosure by the issuer, a period is created, in which 
the issuer might be found liable.  
Meanwhile, besides the legitimate interest of the issuer, which legitimizes the 
delay of disclosure, another exception on delay is provided under the provisions of 
Article 17 (5) and (6) MAR, specifically for financial institutions and with the aim of 
preserving the stability of the financial market. This provision was essential throughout 
the economic crisis period, during which, disclosure of information, considering the 
liquidity of financial and banking institutions, could practically lead to a bank run. Thus, 
these two provisions set a different set of criteria, which apply only for credit or 
financial institutions, and if met altogether, can allow the delay of disclosure of inside 
information on their part. In particular, the disclosure of the inside information must 
entail a risk of undermining the financial stability of the issuer and of the financial 
system as referred above. In addition, it must be in the public interest to delay the 
disclosure and the confidentiality of that information can be ensured96. Finally, the 
competent authority has to determine and consent, after consultation from the 
national central bank and the macro-prudential authority, to the delay on the basis 
that all these conditions are met97.  
F. Administrative Sanctions 
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97 Ibid, Article 17 (6) 
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In its fifth Chapter, the Market Abuse Regulation provides for the 
implementation of administrative sanctions by the national competent authorities, 
acting within their supervisory powers, on natural or legal persons, who are found in 
misconduct under the provisions of the MAR as analysed above. The allocation of 
responsibility for administrative sanctions and supervision is prescribed in particular 
under Article 30 that declares that, without prejudice to any criminal sanctions -which, 
as analyzed above, are a matter of national legislation- or supervisory powers of the 
NCAs, member states must provide for NCAs to be able to take, at least the 
appropriate, and proposed under the second paragraph, administrative sanctions or 
measures, over infringements of specific prohibitions described in the first paragraph, 
which include, between others, the prohibitions under Articles 14, 15 and 17, and over 
failure to cooperate or to comply with an investigation, inspection or request of the 
NCA98. Thus, this provision is enriched and supplemented by the provisions of Articles 
34-41 of Law 4443/2016. In particular in Greece, responsible for the supervision and 
imposition of sanctions is the Hellenic Capital Markets Commission, in cooperation and 
with the contribution of the National Bank of Greece99. 
For the infringement of Articles 14 and 15 MAR, the administrative sanctions, 
as prescribed under Article 37 par. 1a) of Law 4443/2016, predict for a pecuniary fine 
of 10.000 up to 5.000.000 euros or up to the triple value of the profits, if they can be 
defined, if the violator is a natural personal, or if the violator is a legal person, a fine of 
10.000 up to 15.000.000 euros or up to the triple value of the profits, if they can be 
defined, or up to the 15% of the annual turnover100. For the infringement of Article 17 
MAR, Article 37 par. 1b) of Law 4443/2016, predicts for a written reprimand or 
pecuniary fine of 3.000 up to 1.000.000 euros or up to the triple value of the profits, if 
they can be defined, if the violator is a natural personal, or if the violator is a legal 
person, for a written reprimand or a fine of 3.000 up to 2.500.000 euros or up to the 
triple value of the profits, if they can be defined, or up to the 2% of the annual 
turnover101. In tandem to administrative sanctions, the HCMC can also impose 
administrative measures, which are prescribed under Article 37 par. 2 (and correspond 
                                               
98 Ibid, Article 30 par. 1 and 2 
99 (Law 4443/2016 - Official Government Gazette (of the H.R.) 232/A/9-12-2016) Article 35,37 par. 6a) 
100 Ibid, Article 37 par. 1a) 
101 Ibid, Article 37 par. 1b) 
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to the ones prescribed under Article 30 par. 2 (a) – (g) MAR) and include, between 
others, the disgorgement of profits, a public warning or even temporary or permanent 
bans from managing financial institutions or trading in them. In addition, in these 
instances, the National Bank of Greece, can either independently or after a proposal of 
the HCMC, and irrelevant to the sanctions imposed by the Commission, to withdraw or 
suspend the authorisation of an investment firm, to impose a permanent ban of any 
person discharging managerial responsibilities within an investment firm or any other 
natural person who is held responsible for the infringement, from exercising 
management functions in investment firm in the event of repeated infringements of 
Article 14 or 15 or, finally, to impose a temporary ban of a person discharging 
managerial responsibilities within an investment firm or another natural person who is 
held responsible for the infringement, from exercising management functions in 
investment firms or from dealing for his own account102. In addition, for those who 
obstruct an inspection, refuse or obstruct information or give false information during 
an investigation, or refuse, even if summoned, to provide details, give false, or conceal 
details, or refuse to testify before the Hellenic Capital Markets Commission, the 
Commission imposes a pecuniary fine of 3.000 up to 500.000 euros103.  
In the meantime, under Article 39 of Law 4443/2016 and in conjunction with 
Article 32 MAR, the HCMC has adopted part of the procedure of “whistle blowing” and 
specific measures for the protection of people under its course of action. 
Finally, under the provisions of Article 38 of Law 4443/2016 and in conjunction 
with Article 34 MAR, the Hellenic Capital Markets Commission must publish on its 
official website its decisions over administrative sanctions or measures for the 
infringements of the provisions of the Market Abuse Regulation. The publication 
contains information at least on the type and nature of the infringement and the 
identity of the person. The above publication obligation does not apply to decisions 
imposing investigative measures. It must also pubish any legal actions taken against its 
decision, as also the decision of a Court that might cancel its decision on administrative 
sanctions or measures104. 
                                               
102 Ibid, Article 37 par. 6a 
103 Ibid, Article 37 par. 4 




 G. Civil Liability 
 
 Civil liability and, in accordance the right of investors to claim compensation for 
damages suffered from infringements that fall within the scope of the market abuse 
regime, are not expressly regulated in the Regulation. However, it is considered an 
inextricable part in the process of strengthening the prevention and repression of 
market abuse. And this is because, combined with the parallel enforcement of 
administrative and criminal sanctions, it would create too much a risk to take, when 
deciding to act contrary to the rules of law while dealing on a financial market. With 
this in mind, the effectiveness of the MAR reaches a top tier level and is the most 
effective in the achievement of its goals. However, it is up to the member-states to 
regulate or determine, under which standards of liability and which doctrines, investor 
protection, by means of damage claim, shall be enacted and enforced.  
 Under the Greek legal regime, investors have the ability to claim damages for 
infringements of the MAR, under Article 914, in combination with Article 919, of the 
Greek Civil Code (GCC). Article 914, in particular, prescribes that “Any person who 
intentionally (by negligence or at fault) and against the law causes harm or loss to 
another person is liable to his compensation”. In addition, Article 919 prescribes that 
“whoever intentionally in a manner which violates the commands of morality causes 
damage to another is bound to make reparation to the other for any damage thus 
caused”. Hence, civil liability for infringements of the MAR under Greek Law is based 
on fault based liability, fortified by the provision on acts contra bonos mores. However, 
it is for the Greek Courts to determine whether offenders should be held liable only 
under behaviours proven faulty, or if they shall be held responsible for negligence too. 
This determination should be made by also taking into consideration two 
things. The goals and the spirit of the MAR, which constitute the core of the structure 
of the market abuse regime, and the provisions on criminal sanctions under the Greek 
Law 4443/2016, under which the Greek legislator had the opportunity and the ability 
to determine the degree of liability demanded for the incrimination of a violator. The 
case is that the legislator, in all three criminal provisions of the law, as prescribed in 
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Articles 28, 29 and 30, set the maximum degree of liability, under which a violator shall 
be held criminally liable for violations of the MAR, which is that he acted knowingly, 
wilfully and with intent, in order to violate and circumvent the instructions and 




3. The Implementation in the Greek Legal Practice  
In this chapter data which have been excerpted from the annual reports on the official 
site of the Hellenic Capital Market Commission105 will be provided, in order to examine 
how the Greek supervisory and legal system has integrated the new market abuse 
regime. In addition, we will analyze a couple important decisions of Greek 
jurisprudence, in order to examine the legal basis behind the course of action of the 
authorities. Our aim is to determine, whether the provisions that the European and, in 
addition, the Greek legislators prescribed, have found sound and intensive enforcement 
by the supervisory and enforcing authorities and on what legal basis. 
 
A. HCMC Annual Reports 2017 – 2020  
 
 In its official annual reports the Hellenic Capital Market Commission sets out a 
comprehensive analysis of its actions carried out in the past year, according to its 
responsibilities and tasks. Therefore, the Commission provides a comprehensive 
overview of data on its course of action, regarding its role as principal the supervisor of 
both financial institutions and persons dealing on financial products. These data 
include detailed information over the fines and sanctions that were imposed by the 
HCMC and the legal procedures conducted against offenders. As the MAR was 
implemented on July 3rd 2016, the last four annual reports of the Commission are of 
interest and shall be reviewed, in order to determine whether and on what level its 
implementation has been effective.  
 An instant conclusion, while reviewing the abovementioned annual reports of 
the Commission, is that given the fact, that the implementation of the Regulation was 
immediately effective on 2016, with no other need of harmonization actions 
demanded by the member-states, the first ever report of an enforcement act, under 
the MAR provisions, by the Commission, takes place as late as in the annual report of 
2019, over the financial year 2018. In this report, there is the first ever reference of the 
imposition of sanctions on listed companies for infringements of Articles MAR 17 par.1, 
on inside information, and 15, on market abuse and for the infringement of Article 36 
                                               
105 (Hellenic Capital Market Commission, 2021) Annual Reports 2017-2020 
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par. 11 of Law 4443/2016, on denial of supplying evidence106. Until then, all the 
supervisory and enforcement actions of the Commission were made under the scope 
of the Greek Law 3340/2005, which is the law that implemented the Directive 
2003/6/EC. However, this law, such as the Directive, was immediately repealed when 
the MAR came into force. It is therefore quite peculiar that the Commission kept 
running on an amended regulation and was late to implement the MAR. An answer to 
this peculiarity could be provided based on the fact that it is understandable and 
inevitable to still have open cases, which were founded, and therefore still proceed, on 
the older provisions of the law. However, it does not explain, why the Commission, 
acted so late on the enforcement of the new Regulation, taking into account, that 
given its data, for the years 2016 and 2017, 225 and 280 complaints were made and 
116 and 212 of them were concluded accordingly, with the imposition of fines reaching 
2.5 and 3.4 millions on 2016 and 2017 and the creation of overall 9 new criminal 
reports107, but none of them was based on MAR. As a conclusion, therefore, it is 
obvious that a slight delay is detected on the implementation and mostly, on the 
commencement of enforcement of the MAR, by the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission. 
 Through the course of 2018 and 2019108, the HCMC imposed a total of 150.000 
euros on fines on a total of 8 companies, for the infringement of Article 17 par. 1 MAR 
on inside information, and in conjunction with Articles 7 MAR and 27 par. 8 of Law 
4443/2016, a total of 18.000 euros on three companies, for failing to issue their annual 
report as soon as possible. In addition, a total amount of 32.345.000 euros were 
imposed as fines for the infringement of Article 15 MAR, in conjunction with Article 12 
(c), in a total of 12 individuals and 5 legal persons for market abuse through false 
announcements or false economic reports and another 540.000 euros were imposed 
for denial of supplying evidence under Law 4443/2016. Meanwhile, 116 and 85 
complaints for infringements were made and 189 and 188 were concluded, leading to 
the imposition of fines of a total of 208.000 euros and the creation of a total of 26 new 
criminal reports. As a result, while comparing the annual activity of the Commission 
                                               
106 Ibid, Annual Report 2018, p. 79 
107 Ibid, Annual Report 2016, p. 79-86, Annual Report 2017 p. 77-84 
108 Ibid, Annual Reports 2018 & 2019, p .73 & 79 and 72,73 &79 
[37] 
 
year by year, there is an obvious raise of complaints immediately after the 
enforcement of MAR and an effectively fast processing of them, which often resulted 
in the creation of new criminal or administrative cases109.  
 In addition, although in terms of enforcement, the HCMC might appear to have 
delayed the implementation of the MAR, in terms of prevention it has been relatively 
active, mostly through its constant monitoring of the behaviour of its subjects, which 
has very often resulted in sending preventive letters for the compliance of companies 
with the provisions of the law, especially the ones regarding inside information and its 
publication. As a result, most of the companies have complied and followed the 
recommendations of the Commission, which resulted in an effective prevention of 
abusive behaviours110.  
 Finally, before concluding, two more references shall be made, over 
realizations that are made through the review of the annual reports of the 
Commission. First, it is quite important to mention, that the number of cases resolved 
through extrajudicial settlement is high, an opportunity provided in Greece under 
Article 41 par. 3 Law 3943/2010111. That tendency proves that institutions, companies, 
or persons choose often to settle, after negotiating with the HCMC, rather than 
following a legal course of action against the sanctions imposed by it. This choice 
shows, no less, the power of the Commission and its actions over the repression of 
abusive behaviours taking place in the financial market which it supervises. Secondly, 
on every annual report, the HCMC makes reference on the handling of civil law cases - 
besides the ones in front of Administrative or Criminal Courts - showing that in Greece 
civil liability under the market abuse regime, is a notion that constitutes a not 
unknown common practice112.  
 In a nutshell, while reviewing the official annual reports published by the HCMC 
a pretty clear and spherical view is given on its course of action regarding the 
implementation of the MAR on the past 4 years. A delay of enforcement is obvious and 
up to a point understood and justified, but in terms of prevention and general course 
of action with the aim of repression of market abusive behaviours, in the authors 
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opinion the HCMC has definitely lived up to its task, making good use of its tools and 
supervisory powers.  
 
B. Opinion 1/2017 of the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court  
  
 The Supreme Court Prosecutor’s Opinion 1/2017113 is crucial, because it 
clarifies how the process of criminal investigation is conducted, under the MAR regime 
in conjuction with the Law 4443/2016, in Greece. In his opinion he answers to a series 
of questions. The first one is of importance to this analysis, because it determines the 
responsibility of the HCMC to not only supervise misconduct in the financial sector and 
take measures against any instances of violation of the capital markets, but it also has 
to always inform the Public Prosecution for those violations. Public Prosecution is the 
one responsible thereafter to investigate and determine the criminal aspects of the 
violations.  
 In particular, as is prescribed in sector 1.[First part of the question]: “The 
submission of a complaint to the Public Prosecutor by the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission provided for in Article 32§2 must be interpreted in the light of an 
obligation and not a right. Although this obligation is regulated in the (special) law 
4443/2016, it is undoubtedly within the scope of application of the general provision of 
article 37§§2-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to the last provision, other 
civil servants, except investigators, are obliged ("must") to report without delay to the 
competent prosecutor anything they are informed of a criminal act prosecuted ex 
officio, if their information took place during the performance of their duties. A civil 
servant according to article 37 of the CCP means the person who meets the conditions 
of the provision of article 13 lit. c of the Penal Code, ie the person to whom the service 
of a public, municipal or community or other legal entity under public law has been 
entrusted, even temporarily, since the definition of the last provision is approached by 
paragraph 2 of Article 37 of the CCP, referring to "other civil servants" and "those who 
have been temporarily assigned a public service" (see V. Adampa to L. Margariti, Code 
                                               
113 (Supreme Court Prosecutor, 2017) Opinion 1/2017 - Application of criminal provisions of Law 




of Criminal Procedure - interpretation by article, vol. A ', 27 ed. 2012, article 37, 
sidenum. 2, and Ch. Sevastidis, Code of Criminal Procedure - interpretation by article, 
vol. 1, 2011, p. 341). Therefore, the verb [the Hellenic Capital Market Commission) 
"submits" (in the form of Definite Present) in article 32§2 of Law 4443/2016 is 
understood as "must / is obliged to submit" an indictment and not "can / is entitled ", 
because only with this interpretationthe the provision becomes compatible with the 
interpretation of Article 37§2 CCP. This obligation of the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission is obviously foreseen as a necessary complementary element of its 
institutional mission as a supervisory mechanism, and the communication to the 
Prosecutor (in the form of the indictment) of the findings of the previous investigation 
is part of its completion regarding the research of individual responsibility and 
promotes this (the research) at the level of criminal repression, which always remains 
the insurmountable limit of any mechanism exercising (administrative) control (cf. Eft. 
Fitraki, A special case of reporting a crime: The transmission of a finding by the 
Ombudsman to the Prosecutor, Criminal Chron. 2002, pp. 968-976). The above-
mentioned interpretive approach, in our opinion, cannot be shaken by the fact that in 
the Explanatory Memorandum of Law 4443/2016, not aptly, reason for the "possibility" 
of the Hellenic Capital Market Commission, nor from the (outside the chapter of 
criminal provisions) wording of article 36 of the law, in which, among the numerous 
(and in various ways exercised) responsibilities and rights of the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission (a text of extent of 3,5 pages of the Official Gazette) also provides the 
provision that “the Hellenic Capital Market Commission may ... refer to the competent 
criminal prosecutor for criminal investigation of cases ...”. It should be noted that if the 
above obligated person to report a criminal offense omits this obligation commits a 
criminal breach of duty (Article 259 of the Penal Code), under the self-evident condition 
of the determination of the elements of the subjective existence of this offense (see 
Opinion EsprotKav 1/1997, Reg. 1997, 1062 and V. Adamba, op. cit., oblique. 8)”. 
  It is therefore evident that, in Greece, the criminal investigation of market 
abusive behaviours, detected by or reported to the HCMC, constitutes an 
uncompromising obligation, and simultaneously an exclusive right, of the state, 
following the obligation of the HCMC for its immediate and complete briefing. It is not, 
consequently, in the authority of the Commission to determine whether a criminal 
[40] 
 
investigation or criminal prosecution is to be conducted, over instances of violations of 
the MAR and its relevant provisions, and the prosecution does furthermore not relate 
this decision to the final imposition of administrative fines by the Commission. 
However, the Commission is obliged to inform the competent criminal prosecutor and 
provide him with a complete file on the research findings, collected during its own 
investigation, in order for them to be associated with the criminal prosecution that 
may be conducted by his order.  
 Conclusively, the commencement of the criminal procedure and criminal 
investigation, over offensive behaviours conducted in the financial market, seems 
inevitable under the Greek legal regime. This is the result of the choice made by the 
Greek legislator, during the incorporation of the CRIM-MAD 2014/57/EU, which 
determined that in the Greek legal order, the criminal assessment of market abusive 
behaviours is equally important as the imposition of administrative fines. This method 
recognizes and underlines the importance of a collective action of the state, against 
the violation of the provisions that protect the rightful conduct of dealing in the 
financial sector following the European rationale that the bigger the risk and range of 
sanctions, the more effective the repression of those violations is. 
 
C. Decision 1607/2016 Council of State 
 
Civil Liability of violators of the MAR and its relevant provisions is based, as 
mentioned above under Chapter 2.G on Civil Liability, on the provision of Article 914 
CC. This type of civil liability concerns mostly violators in the terms of private legal 
persons or physical persons. However, in its decision 1607/2016, the Council of State 
makes reference on the matter of civil liability and the obligation of the state or a legal 
entity of public law for compensation based on Articles 105 and 106 of the 
Introductory Law of the Civil Code.  
In particular, it is mentioned that “14. Because, according to the established 
judgments, from the provisions of articles 105 and 106 of the Introductory Law of the 
Civil Code (PD 456/1984 – A’ 164) it is concluded that the State or legal entity of public 
law is liable for compensation for illegal acts or omissions of its organs which caused 
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damage to a third party, for those, that is, acts and omissions which violated a certain 
provision of law that protects the right or interest of the injured party, if this illegal act 
was committed during the exercise of the public service. On the other hand, there is no 
civil liability of the State or of a legal person governed by public law if the act or 
omission was committed in breach of a provision which has been imposed in the public 
interest. Such is the provision which directly and exclusively concerns the public 
interest, but not the provision which, although in the general interest, also establishes a 
right in favor of a certain person. … 16. Because, the special nature of the state 
supervision over the investment enterprises, as a complex and particularly difficult 
state broad concept of activity, is not combined with the operation of the provision of 
article 105 ILCC, as it has been interpreted and applied so far. This is because the 
peculiarities of this state activity, as established and organized by the provisions set out 
in previous paragraphs - which are distinguished by their complexity, combined with 
the uncertainty of the result of the supervisory control, which is primarily aimed at the 
proper functioning of the investment market, with ensuring the solvency of the 
investment firms, and reflexively, through this control, ends up indirectly protecting the 
investors - it essentially differentiates this activity of the Administration from the other 
state activities. Therefore, in view of the peculiarities of the supervisory function in the 
investment market, the restoration of the loss that may arise from the improper 
exercise of supervision over the investment companies can be sought only with a 
corresponding application of article 105 ILCC, in the sense that, in order to establish the 
civil liability of the State or of a legal person governed by public law, the assistance of 
additional conditions is required, and the compensation that may be awarded in such 
cases is not required to be complete, but sufficient as long as it is reasonable. … The 
above peculiarities in the exercise of the state-wide concept of supervision over these 
enterprises, which differentiate it as a state-wide activity from other forms of state 
activity would impose, therefore, in order to satisfy the constitutional requirement of 
Article 4 par. 5 of the Constitution and in order not to be left without compensation the 
damage caused to investors of an investment company by improper supervision 
exercise (CoS 3783/2014, cf. 1501 / 2014), the corresponding application of article 105 
ILCC, in the sense that the liability of the State or a legal entity of public law for 
compensation can be born not with any illegality of the Administration but only in case 
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of obvious and serious error , meaning in case of obvious and serious illegality of the 
supervisory bodies and with the payment to the affected investors not in full but only of 
reasonable compensation (CoS 3783/2014).” 
It is concluded, therefore, that in the Greek legal system civil liability of the 
State or a legal entity of public law is predicted for the compensation of damages 
caused to a third party, in our case an investor, due to an illegal act or omission of the 
state. However, in the case of financial markets and the compensation of investors for 
damages caused by defective supervision by the HCMC, the responsibility of the state 
is to be interpreted strictly. This is because such supervision takes place in a field of 
activity involving firstly, significant inherent risk of injury to those involved (investors) 
and this involvement requires and proves a previous acceptance of such risk, and 
secondly, complex and difficult economic evaluations leaving the supervision at the 
discretion of the organization. Consequently, the compensation deriving from 
improper supervision is achieved only by an analogical implementation of Article 105 
ILCC and only in the case of an obvious and serious illegal act of the HCMC justifying a 




 This analysis was conducted in order to draw the attention and shed light to the 
rationale followed by the european legislator during the institutionalization of the 
MAR, and the rest of its relevant and implementing acts, under which an effective 
supervision is inseparable to an effective and multidimensional sanctioning system. 
Besides, this was the conclusion reached by the group of experts chaired by Jacques de 
Larosière in 2009, after the latest economic crisis, which was the outcome of a global 
financial system, which was ultimately found to be out of control and lacked proper 
and effective supervision. 
Hence, through the course of our analysis, reference was made to the main 
forms of liability deriving from the new Market Abuse Regulation, in conjunction with 
the sanctions that may be imposed in the light of breach of such liabilities. Whether 
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those sanctions stem directly from the European Regulation or from national 
implementing acts, their institutionalization and further enforcement constitute the 
basic criterion, in order to determine both the framework within which the national 
supervisory authorities and national courts are to implement the new provisions and, 
most importantly, the effectiveness of this implementation. 
In the author’s opinion, putting aside the provisions that have been directly 
implemented in the Greek legal system through the direct effect of the Regulation, 
which mostly concern matters of liability and administrative sanctions, the Greek 
legislator, in his part, followed the spirit and rationale of the European one. 
Specifically, he proceeded to the adoption of a legislative method, which includes a 
structured and effective supervisory regime, reinforced with the imposition of all kinds 
of sanctions. In other words, he did not hesitate to legislate, alongside administrative 
sanctions, the implementation of criminal sanctions. And those criminal sanctions are 
anything but indifferent. In particular, Law 4443/2016 explicitly provides for the 
criminal prosecution of offenders, in a mandatory manner and not at the discretion of 
the supervisory authority (as analyzed above under the  Opinion 1/2017 of the 
Supreme Court Prosecutor), both in the degree of misdemeanor and in the degree of 
felony, by imposing severe penalties on offenders found guilty. At the same time, 
Greek legislation does not preclude the combination and imposition of both 
administrative and criminal sanctions, not only in the form of pecuniary fines on both 
instances, but also, for example, in the form of a license revocation and permanent 
ban from dealing in financial instruments or even of the deprivation of freedom in the 
case of felonies. The combined threat of these two types of sanctions, with the parallel 
possibility of investors to claim compensation for their damages, which is based on 
fundamental principles of Greek civil law, creates an extremely burdensome 
environment for misconduct in the financial sector. 
From the above, it can be concluded that, institutionally, the Greek legislator, 
sought and really managed to establish a strong legal framework of sanctions, capable 
of preventing future delinquent behaviour. And although it is too soon to actually 
examine, whether this new legal framework has practically managed to repress market 
abusive behaviours, considering that legal procedures take time to conclude and, thus 
we do not yet have a concrete and complete view of their enforcement and 
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effectiveness, however by analyzing the data that the HCMC publishes in its annual 
reports, we do recognize an increase in its activity these past 5 years, after the entry 
into force of the MAR. And, as analyzed above, this amplified activity also leads to an 
increased activity of the state and criminal prosecution. 
In conclusion, in the author’s opinion, on the one hand the new legal regime on 
market abuse in Greece seems to be in full compliance with the European beliefs and 
requirements, providing a multidimensional and spherical supervisory and sanctioning 
system and, on the other hand, in the first years of its implementation and 
enforcement, seems that it has mobilize effectively both the supervisory authorities 
and the State. Therefore, even if we are not yet able to determine the fulfillment of 
the goals set out by the European legislator under the adoption of the new market 
abuse regime, we can safely foresee and expect an increase of its effectiveness in the 
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